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Abstract 
This chapter suggests that it is important to incorporate the concept of culture into both the 
theoretical frameworks and the empirical research on cooperation in social dilemmas. It proposes 
a broader interpretation of the appropriateness framework (March, 1994) in decision making in 
social dilemmas (Messick, 1999; Weber, Kopelman, and Messick, 2004) that includes group 
culture. It does not diminish the contribution of the appropriateness framework that teases apart 
the identity from recognition of the situation and the relevant rules, but rather offers a model that 
also encompasses group culture as a distinct fourth construct. Thus, when faced with the choice 
to cooperate or defect, rather than being guided strictly by rational choice or expected utility 
models, a decision-maker may be best guided by the question: “what does a person like me do in 
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Does culture influence decision making in a global economy? Without doubt, culture 
influences the cuisine we prefer and whether we are likely to order and enjoy a rack of lamb 
smothered in a Southwestern U.S.-style barbeque sauce and a cold beer, lamb stew à la 
Provençale with a glass of red wine, or lamb marinated in fresh herbs and served over rice along 
with hot mint tea. Even in an era of fusion restaurants and widespread globalization, culture may 
influence how decision-makers manage both local and global resources in situations that risk the 
tragedy of the commons—the classic example being the decision of a herdsman grazing sheep1 
on a common pasture whether to cooperate or defect (G. Hardin, 1968). That is, the cultural 
context provides insights into the problem of cooperation. We may learn how to effectively 
manage resources in such social dilemma settings (for a review see, Dawes, 1980; Messick & 
Brewer, 1983; Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2002), by studying solutions that arise in distinct 
cultural settings (e.g., McCay, 2002; Ahn, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2004). Furthermore, even if a 
global management culture may be emerging, this by no means indicates homogeneity of group-
level culture. Unique sub-cultures continue to emerge on an organizational and institutional level 
in which the effect of group-level factors such as cultural values and norms is critical to 
understanding decisions and the behavior of decision makers (e.g., Gelfand & Brett, 2004; 
Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Therefore it is important to incorporate the concept of culture into 
both the theoretical frameworks and the empirical research on cooperation in social dilemmas.  
In general, social dilemmas can be defined as situations “… in which individual 
rationality leads to collective irrationality. That is, individually reasonable behavior leads to a 
situation in which everyone is worse off than they might have been otherwise,” (Kollock, 1998, 
                                                 
1 Sheep in French is mouton and in Hebrew kivsa (French and Hebrew translations of English were arbitrarily 
referred to in the title to represent unique cultures in different parts of the world). 
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p. 183). For example, common dilemmas emerge when decision makers all have access to a 
common resource, but no one has the right to exclude others and thus they are likely to 
collectively take for themselves more than would be sustainable. These are situations in which 
collective non-cooperation leads to a serious threat of depletion of future resources (C. D. Hardin 
& Higgins, 1996; Van Lange, Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 1992). Likewise, in public goods 
dilemmas, given that people have free access to a collective good, reduces the incentive to 
contribute voluntarily to the provision of that good. If there are many free riders in a population 
relative to the number of contributors, public goods disappear, because contributors, noting they 
are being taken advantage of, withdraw their support (Ostrom, 2000). Social psychologists, 
anthropologists, economists, sociologists, and political scientists alike have demonstrated great 
interest in understanding when people make cooperative choices rather than selfish choices, why 
people make the choices they do, what the factors are that influence cooperation in a social 
dilemma, and the interventions that are effective in eliciting more socially advantageous 
behavior (e.g., Agrawal, 2002; Dawes, 1980; Kollock, 1998; Komorita & Parks, 1996; Ledyard, 
1995; Messick & Brewer, 1983; Van Lange, Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 1992a; Kopelman et 
al., 2002).  
There are two prevailing theoretical frameworks to decision making in social dilemmas: 
the expected utility (EU) model and the rational choice model (Ledyard, 1995; Luce & Raiffa, 
1957; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). These models presume vigilant, calculating decision makers who 
assess choice environments with care, determine the probable utility (i.e., payoff) associated with 
each possible choice, and then choose to maximize their EU. The appropriateness framework, an 
alternative theoretical approach to decision making in social dilemmas, suggests that people 
making decisions ask themselves (explicitly or implicitly): “What does a person like me do in a 
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situation like this?” (March, 1994; Messick, 1999; Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). This 
question identifies three significant factors: (1) the identity of the individual making the decision; 
(2) the recognition and definition of the kind of situation encountered; and (3) the application of 
rules or heuristics in guiding behavioral choice. In contrast with the EU and the rational choice 
models, the appropriateness framework accommodates the inherently social nature of social 
dilemmas and the role of rule- and heuristic-based processing.  
This chapter suggests a broader interpretation of the appropriateness framework in 
decision making that includes group culture and therefore offers a better understanding of 
cooperation in social dilemmas. While the general constructs of the appropriateness 
framework—identity, rules, and recognition—could be universally applied, a narrow 
interpretation, for example, of identity as a self-focused atomistic entity, is characteristic of 
some, but not all, cultures. Thus, the question “What does a person like me” may overemphasize 
the self over the group. Where does the group fit in? Is an individual perceived to be a separate 
entity from the group? Is the group simply part of the entire situation? Are situations independent 
of the individuals involved? Are rules context-free? Thus, rules and recognition of the 
situation—“…do in a situation like this?” —also might have substantially different implications, 
depending on a group’s culture. If most people in some cultures are likely to answer the three 
factors (identity, recognition, and rules) differently than most people in other cultures, then 
adding a cultural lens to the appropriateness framework will provide a better understanding of 
cooperation in social dilemmas. The three appropriateness factors—the identity of the individual 
making the decision, recognition and definition of the kind of situation encountered, and the 
application of rules or heuristics in guiding behavioral choice—are interrelated in all cultures. 
And yet, defining them as distinct constructs proves theoretically illuminating. Currently, the 
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effect of culture—a group-level variable—is implied and embedded in identity, recognition of 
the situation, and applied rules. A model is not proposed here that diminishes the contribution of 
teasing apart the three factors, but rather a model that also encompasses group culture as a 
distinct fourth construct.  
 
Culture and Appropriateness Framework 
Embedding a group-cultural level identity in the appropriateness framework of decision 
making in social dilemmas provides a more encompassing theoretical model of factors that 
influence individual cooperation. Culture, in the decision-making literature, is defined as a 
mental model shared by at least two people (Deutsch, 1973), which influences what people 
believe is important (values) and what they consider to be appropriate behavior (norms) 
(Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994). It is not surprising that the appropriateness framework has 
ignored group culture given that the empirical literature on social dilemmas has developed in 
what has been described as a cultural “vacuum” (Brett & Kopelman, 2004).  
An expansive experimental literature in social psychology and experimental economics 
has treated an array of psychological factors that influence individual cooperation (e.g., 
Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2002). These factors include the study of individual and 
situational independent variables in give-some (public good dilemmas) and take-some games 
(common dilemmas), two-person and multi-person prisoner’s dilemmas in the laboratory, as well 
as field experiments. Despite this plethora of research, the effect of group culture per se on 
choice in social dilemmas has not been widely studied; and, indeed, the paucity of studies that 
focus on group culture as a predictive variable is noteworthy, especially as the impact of culture 
has received increasing attention in the social and cognitive psychology literature (e.g., Markus 
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& Kitayama, 1991).  
The role of cultural values and norms in the decision of whether to cooperate or defect in 
social dilemma situations has been explored by only a few studies, but mostly has been treated as 
a control variable or an empirical artifact of data collection in different countries, rather than as a 
theoretical construct (Brett & Kopelman, 2004). Culture can be treated not only as a 
psychological construct, but also on an institutional level, including a society’s characteristic 
laws and social structures, such as schools and government agencies, which monitor and sanction 
cooperation. According to research in social psychology and experimental economics, group 
culture plays a central role in how people think, feel, and behave in resource allocation settings 
(Gelfand & Dyer, 2000; Lytle, Brett, Barsness, Tinsley, & Janssens, 1995). In this literature, 
culture is usually treated as a group-level psychological construct that influences decision 
making. Thus, group culture influences the emergence of identity, how people perceive 
situations, and what behavioral rules they apply.  
 
Culture and Identity 
Identity is a complex, multifaceted factor in the appropriateness framework. Often social 
scientists associate identity only with personality factors, and clearly, people do differ along 
personality dimensions such as self-monitoring (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986), or locus of control 
(Lefcourt, 1982). However, they also differ in other ways, such as their social value orientations 
(Messick & McClintock, 1968), the nature of their personal histories (Bettenhausen & 
Murnighan, 1985, , 1991; Forgas, 1982), and personal experiences. Identity also encompasses 
social identity (Brewer, 1991; Taylor & Modhaddam, 1994; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987) and cultural influences (Moghaddam, Taylor, & Wright, 1993). Identity is, 
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therefore, an umbrella concept that includes all the idiosyncratic factors that individuals bring 
with them into a social situation. The term identity, then, includes the consideration of socially 
defined roles and the various idiosyncratic traits (Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004) and 
confounds these with cultural identity (i.e., shared group-level identity). 
One of the most commonly studied effects of group culture in social psychology is the 
influence it has on the concept of the self. It is reflected by the cultural value of individualism 
versus collectivism (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994). Decision makers from individualist 
cultures (e.g., United States) think of themselves independently of the social groups to which 
they belong and make decisions with little concern for social imperatives to consider the interests 
of others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Thus, what is valued in individualistic societies is self-
interest. In a social dilemma setting, this leads to main effect predictions that individualistic 
decision makers will be less likely to cooperate, but will enact individual profit-maximizing 
behavior. In contrast, collectivist cultures (e.g., Vietnam, Japan, and China) value group 
interests. People self-construe in terms of social group membership and are more likely to think 
in terms of “we” than in terms of “I.” These individuals make distinctions between in-groups of 
which they are members and with whom they cooperate and out-groups of which they are not 
members and with which they compete (Triandis, 1989). In fact, comparative cross-cultural 
research documents that decision makers from collective cultures are more cooperative than 
individualists in social dilemmas. For example, in contrast to decision makers from the United 
States (an individualistic culture), decision makers from collectivist cultures such as Vietnam 
(Parks & Vu, 1994), Japan (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002), and China (Brett, 2001; Hemesath & 
Pomponio, 1998) are more cooperative. The social imperatives in a collective society motivate 
decision makers to place group interests before individual interests, and therefore they are more 
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likely to cooperate in social dilemmas. 
Another widely studied identity factor is the effect of social motives. Social motives, or 
people’s goals for resource allocation in socially interdependent situations (also called social 
value orientations), influence cooperative choice in social dilemmas (Kramer, McClintock, & 
Messick, 1986; Parks, 1994; Roch & Samuelson, 1997). Pro-social decision makers (whose 
social motive is to maximize joint gains) make more cooperative choices in social dilemmas than 
pro-self decision makers (motivated to maximize own and or own relative to other’s gain). Some 
research suggests that social motives are at least in part a function of the social environment in 
which decision makers grow up (Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997), and therefore 
they may be influenced by group culture. A common theoretical assumption is that decision 
makers from collectivist cultures will be more likely to be pro-social, whereas those from 
individualistic cultures are pro-self. For example, a study of managers in an executive MBA 
program reports proportionately more pro-self decision makers from individualist cultures like 
the U.S. and Israel and more pro-social decision makers from Germany (where economic and 
political ideology reflects collective values) and Hong Kong (where social values are collective) 
(Kopelman, 1999). Although social motives are related to cultural values, they are not 
synonymous (Gaerling, 1999; Probst, Carnevale, & Triandis, 1999), possibly because cultural 
values are broader constructs than social motives. Social motives are an individual-level variable, 
whereas culture is a group-level variable and thus, although they interact, they are distinct 
constructs. 
 
Culture and Recognition of the Situation 
To act, people must answer the question: “What kind of situation is this?” (Messick, 
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1999, p. 13). Answering this question defines and classifies the situation and hinges on 
recognition, on matching features of the situation to features of other situations that are already 
(at least partly) understood. Recognition, therefore, is an act of categorization according to event 
prototypes— “coherent and interrelated sets of characteristics concerning the sort of person who 
typically features in the event, the typical explanation for the event and so on,” (Lalljee, Lamb, & 
Abelson, 1992, p. 153). The definition of the situation suggests a choice set and is part of the 
appropriateness framework. The choice set includes questions such as: Is this a cooperative 
situation or a competitive situation? Is this a group task or an individual task? Is this a game or a 
problem to be solved? Is this a one-shot dilemma or an iterated dilemma? Is this a dilemma that 
demands an anonymous or a public choice? The definition of the situation should answer at least 
some of these questions. The definition of the situation informs the person about the norms, 
expectations, rules, learned behaviors, skills, and possible strategies that are relevant. It should 
be, therefore, the proximal mediator of behavioral choice (Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). 
Some situational categorizations will yield a constrained list of possible behaviors, while others 
may be more ambiguous and consequently elicit a broad array of possible behaviors (e.g., 
Forgas, 1982). The recognition question encompasses yet additional factors—the understanding 
of a situation within its social and cultural context. 
Group culture provides insight into the different solutions that groups evolve to manage 
socially interdependent situations. Culture is a socially shared knowledge structure, or schema, 
giving meaning to incoming stimuli and channeling outgoing reactions (Triandis, 1972). In this 
respect, cultural values (what is important) and norms (what is appropriate) provide the members 
of a cultural group with schemas, or templates, for interpreting a situation (Fiske & Taylor, 
1991). Situational factors that influence social dilemmas include features of the task structure 
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itself (the decision structure and the social structure) and the perception of the task (Kopelman, 
Weber, & Messick, 2002). The decision structure includes factors like the payoff structure and 
the amount and type of uncertainty involved in the resource. The social structure includes factors 
such as the power and status of the individuals or organizations, the size of the group, and the 
ability of people to communicate with one another. Perceptual factors include perceived causes 
of shortages, or the way cooperation is framed.  
One cultural value likely to influence recognition of the social structure of the social 
dilemma is whether individuals have a tendency to assume hierarchy among group members. 
The cultural value of hierarchy versus egalitarianism reflects the extent to which individuals 
focus on social status and power (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994). Hierarchy refers to the 
importance placed on ascribed hierarchical roles in structuring interactions and allocating 
resources. In egalitarian cultures, status differences are deemphasized, and power distances are 
less salient in social interactions and economic exchange. In hierarchical cultures, social status 
implies social power, so lower-status individuals are expected to defer to higher-status 
individuals (Leung, 1997). Hierarchy versus egalitarianism may lead to cultural differences in 
how people react to and view appointing a leader to aid in achieving goals in social dilemmas. 
There is a large literature identifying the conditions under which group members (in the U.S., 
which is an egalitarian culture) are willing to appoint leaders. This research suggests that groups 
will opt for a leader when they have failed to manage a resource efficiently, and inequalities in 
harvesting outcomes emerge, and followers will endorse leaders who use fair procedures while 
maintaining the common resource (Wilke, de Boer, & Liebrand, 1986; Wit & Wilke, 1988; Wit, 
Wilke, & Van Dijk, 1989). Because there is greater deference to authority in hierarchical than 
egalitarian cultures (Brett, 2001), decision makers from hierarchical cultures may be more 
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willing to turn control of the resource over to a leader, even before trying self-control, than 
decision makers from egalitarian cultures. Decision makers from hierarchical cultures also may 
have more confidence that their leaders will protect the interests of the group as a whole than 
decision makers from egalitarian cultures where interest groups lobby successfully for special 
treatment from government authorities.  
Culture may also influence how individuals recognize and react to inter- versus intra-
group situations. An inter-group paradigm of social dilemmas is set up such that the goal of 
doing the best for yourself is achieved by cooperating with in-groups and competing with out-
groups (Bornstein, 1992; Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994). The task structure differs from the 
regular intra-group paradigm because it has an inter-group competitive element that increases 
cooperation with the in-group. Decision makers in all cultures studied to date were responsive to 
this task structure, competing with in- group members in the single group context and twice as 
likely to cooperate with them in the inter-group context (Bornstein, 1992; Bornstein & Ben-
Yossef, 1994; Bornstein, Erev, & Goren, 1994). However, the inter-group effect may be 
moderated by culture.  
In general, collectivists distinguish between in-group and out-group members more 
strongly than individualists (Triandis, 1989), cooperating with in-group members and competing 
with out-group members. Collectivists not only may make clearer distinctions between in- and 
out-groups than individualists, but they also may define in- and out-groups differently. Both 
factors may lead collectivists to make rather different decisions in inter-group situations. 
Furthermore, culturally based assumptions of hierarchy versus egalitarianism may come into 
play. When studied along with the cultural value of individualism versus collectivism, four 
categories are defined as follows (e.g., Triandis & Gelfand, 1998): (1) vertical-individualists 
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(high on hierarchy and high on individualism): (2) horizontal-individualists (low on hierarchy 
and high on individualism); (3) vertical-collectivists (high on hierarchy and low on 
individualism); and (4) horizontal-collectivists (low on hierarchy and low on individualism). 
Probst and her colleagues (1999) contrasted the single group decision-making context with an 
inter-group context in cross-cultural settings. They found that decision makers from individualist 
and hierarchical cultures (vertical individualists) were more likely to cooperate, similarly to 
decision makers in the Bornstein inter-group paradigm games. They were significantly less 
cooperative in the single-group context than in the inter-group context where in-group 
cooperation served to maximize their own individual payoffs. In contrast, vertical collectivists 
acted differently in the inter-group context. They cooperated with their three-person in-group 
less in the inter-group context than in the single group context, perhaps because they viewed the 
entire set of six people as an in-group with whom to cooperate. They saw that cooperating across 
inter-group boundaries maximized for the six as a whole, even though such behavior would not 
maximize for them personally. Probst et al. (1999) suggested that the vertical collectivists, whose 
defining characteristic relates to sacrificing own interests for the interests of the group, redefined 
the “group.”  
 
Culture and Rules 
Rules simplify behavioral choices by narrowing options in social dilemmas. Utility 
maximization (especially in narrow economic terms) is only one of many possible decision rules 
that may apply in the appropriateness framework (Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). The 
category of rules that may influence behavior in social dilemmas includes not only explicit and 
codified guidelines for behavior (e.g., codes of ethics or laws), but also the less visible and 
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explicit influence of social heuristics (e.g., “women and children first” (Allison & Messick, 
1990)) and habitual rituals (e.g., the equal division of resources (Messick, 1993), or equity norms 
(Adams, 1963)). These may all be influenced by cultural norms.  
Cultural norms are rules of appropriate social interaction behavior—what one “ought” to 
do in a given situation. Norms are relevant to choice in social dilemmas because “they provide a 
means of controlling behavior without entailing the costs, uncertainties, resistances, conflicts and 
power losses involved in the unrestrained, ad hoc use of interpersonal power,” (Thibaut & 
Kelley, 1959, p. 147). Thus, cultural norms influence what rules decision makers are likely to 
adopt. Given a specific situation, culturally appropriate scripts, or sequences of appropriate 
social action may be adopted (Shank & Abelson, 1977).  
Communities develop rather different solutions for resource allocation problems in social 
dilemmas because of cultural variation in what groups consider fair. Experimental research 
shows that norm formation occurs quite rapidly in groups (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985) 
and then settles in to sustain group behavior over time. Cultural differences may become more 
pronounced over time. This appears to happen because cultural norms become elaborated. For 
example, definitions of who may use the resource can become refined, and rights may be passed 
down from generation to generation (Ostrom, 1990). 
What is perceived to be fair in one culture may not be in another (Leung, 1997). In an 
ultimatum bargaining setting, the amount considered fair to Israeli and Japanese decision makers 
was different from the amount considered to be fair in U.S. and Yugoslavian cultures. When 
asked to make fair divisions of a good (usually money or candy), Chinese and Japanese decision 
makers typically distribute it more evenly than those from Australia or the U.S. (Kashima, 
Siegal, Tanaka, & Isaka, 1988; Leung & Bond, 1984; Mann, Radford, & Kanagawa, 1985). 
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Similarly, a contextual model confirmed an interaction between group culture and power on 
claiming resources in a simulated social dilemma (Kopelman, 2003). In a common dilemma 
where parties have different economic power (asymmetric dilemma), managers from different 
cultural groups—vertical-individualists (Israeli), vertical-collectivists (Hong Kong Chinese), 
horizontal-individualists (U.S.), and horizontal-collectivists (German) —seem to have applied 
different decision rules based on culturally appropriate fairness norms. Relative to managers 
from the U.S. and Germany, Israeli managers were more likely to follow an individually rational 
decision-making approach taking more resources in a high versus low economic power condition 
(following an equity rule), whereas decisions of Hong Kong Chinese managers reflected a 
collective rationality approach, forgoing individual profits by taking fewer resources in a high 
economic power condition (following an inverse equity rule). The influence of group culture was 
partially mediated by egocentric perceptions of fairness. Thus, culture influences the rules 
engaged in social dilemmas. 
 
Discussion 
This review of the appropriateness framework suggests that group culture influences all 
three current factors: identity, rules, and recognition of the situation. The identity of the 
individual making the decision, application of rules or heuristics in guiding behavioral choice, 
and recognition and definition of the kind of situation encountered could all be influenced by 
group culture. Whereas culture permeates these decision factors, it holds an important enough 
influence to be treated as a fourth factor. March’s (1004) question: “What does a person like me 
do in a situation like this?” overemphasizes the self and ignores the group. Group-level values 
and norms, that is, group culture, significantly impacts cooperation in social dilemmas and 
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decision making at large. This chapter suggests a broader conceptualization of the 
appropriateness framework would take group culture into consideration and rephrase March’s 
question to: “What does a person like me do in a situation like this given this group culture?”  
Theorizing the application of culture in the decision-making process in resolving social 
dilemmas has implications for both researchers and practitioners. To better understand decision 
making, future empirical research will need to examine the effect of group culture on social 
dilemmas within a contextual framework. A contextual approach to group culture stresses the 
importance of examining the interactions between group culture and individual difference 
measures or situational factors, such that culture is a necessary but not a sufficient determinant of 
decision making (Gelfand & Dyer, 2000). In a social dilemma setting, this translates into 
studying the interaction among group culture, identity, recognition, and rules. Although this 
chapter has focused on social dilemmas, outcome implications are not limited to the decision-
making process in such interdependent settings and maybe generalized to decision making in any 
social context. Better understanding of the influence of group culture on the decision-making 
process can help practitioners interpret different patterns of observed behavior, as well as design 
appropriate interventions for global resource management.  
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